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Michael Murez, Joulia Smortchkova, Brent Strickland 
The Mental Files Theory of Singular Thought: A Psychological Perspective 
DRAFT VERSION submitted on August 1st 2015 for volume on Mental Files and 
Singular Thought. Contracted with Oxford University Press, edited by J. Genone, 
R.Goodman & N. Kroll. (Please do not cite without permission). Contact: 
michael.murez@ens.fr 
Abstract: We argue that the most ambitious version of the mental files theory of singular 
thought, according to which mental files are a wide-ranging psychological natural kind 
underlying all and only singular thinking, is unsupported by the available psychological data. 
Nevertheless, critical examination of the theory from a psychological perspective opens up 
promising avenues for research, especially concerning the relationship between our perceptual 
capacity to individuate and track basic individuals, and our higher level capacities for singular 
thought. 
 
1. Introducing singular thought: the philosophical explanandum 
Many thoughts are general: they are about properties or categories. For example, the generic 
thought that wombats are cute is paradigmatically general.1 So are quantificational thoughts, 
like the thoughts that all (or some) wombats are cute. However, we also have singular 
thoughts, thoughts about particular individuals. For example, if one sees an unfamiliar 
creature and judges that it is cute, whatever it is, one's thought is singular: One is thinking 
about that very individual, which one sees but cannot recognize. Such perception-based 
demonstrative thoughts are the most basic variety of singular thoughts. But other varieties 
exist, which are based on memory or communication rather than perception. For example, 
until now, you had never heard of Patrick, the “wombassador” from Ballarat. Yet now we 
have told you about Patrick the wombat, you can think about him – for instance, you may 
wonder whether Patrick is cute.  
 
There are also descriptive thoughts, thoughts about whatever satisfies a certain description: 
for example, the thought that the world's oldest wombat (whichever one that is) is cute. Since 
the world's oldest wombat happens to be Patrick, this thought is also, in a sense, about a 
particular individual: what makes the thought accurate is Patrick's being cute. Yet unlike 
genuine singular thoughts, descriptive thoughts are not about individuals per se. They refer to 
individuals only indirectly, by representing attributes they possess (e.g., wombathood and 
elderliness). If some other wombat had turned out the oldest, the same thought would have 
been about it instead. Hence, descriptive thoughts about individuals are considered a kind of 
general (quantificational) thought: they are really about small categories, with at most one 
member, rather than directly about the particular category members themselves. 
                                                 
1
 A generic thought is about a category or kind. While classifying generic thoughts as general is  common, for 
example in encyclopedia entries (Crawford, 2013) they are sometimes described as singular, for the 
following reasons: a) occasionally the term ‘singular’ is used, misleadingly, for all nondescriptive thoughts b) 
sometimes kinds are identified with special sorts of individuals which occupy multiple disconnected 
locations at the same time. We find this use of ‘singular’ misleading, given the straightforward fact that 
multiple individuals can belong to the same kind. But in any case, classifying generic thoughts as singular 
would only strengthen the arguments we make in this chapter. 
2 
 
 
The distinction between descriptive and nondescriptive2 ‘modes of aboutness’ (Sellars, 1949) 
applies not only to thoughts about individuals, but also to thoughts about general entities like 
properties (‘the color of daffodils’ vs. ‘yellow’) or kinds (‘mammals whose scat is cubical’ vs. 
‘wombats’). So, underlying the dichotomy of singular and general thought, we have a finer-
grained fourfold classification of thoughts along two dimensions – the nature of their subject 
matter or referential content, and whether or not their reference is determined through 
satisfaction of a descriptive condition:  
 Nondescriptive Descriptive 
Individual Singular thought General thought 
Property or kind General thought General thought 
 
Among these varieties of thought, singular thought has been claimed to be special in various 
ways, e.g., with respect to its epistemology, metaphysics, or role in the naturalization of 
content. However, from an opposing perspective, singular thought has also been claimed by 
so-called descriptivists (Lewis, 1984; Schiffer, 1978; Searle, 1983) to bear no essential 
difference to descriptive – hence general – thought. 
One of the main descriptivist arguments stems from Frege Cases, in which subjects rationally 
attribute contradictory properties to the same referent. For example, someone who does not 
realize that Fat Pat is Patrick can rationally judge that Patrick is cute, yet concurrently deny 
that Fat Pat is.  
To account for such cases, philosophers have proposed that thoughts can involve distinct 
“modes of presentation” (MOPs) of the same referents, which are functionally defined by 
Frege's Constraint: One can rationally think, of some entity, that it has a certain property and 
its negation just in case one represents the entity under different MOPs (Schiffer, 1990). 
MOPs also satisfy a Transparency Constraint: one can know purely introspectively whether 
the MOPs under which one is thinking of something are identical or different (Boghossian, 
1994). 
Descriptivists claim only descriptions can fill the role of MOPs. Since MOPs feature in cases 
of apparently singular thinking, descriptivists conclude that even seemingly singular thoughts 
actually go through descriptions. The contrast between singular and descriptive thought 
dissolves. 
However, there are well-known independent reasons to reject descriptivism (Kripke, 1980). 
Among these, it seems one could be wrong, ignorant, or change opinions about how to 
describe an individual, yet still think about it. For example, one can think about Patrick 
without being able to tell him qualitatively apart from a homonymous twin,3 or keep track of 
                                                 
2
 This distinction is also known  following Bach (1987) as the ‘satisfactional/nonsatisfactional’ distinction. 
3
 Even infants countenance the possibility of indistinguishable individuals being different, for example by 
3 
 
him over time as one’s conception of him evolves: “It's a bird, it's a plane, it's Superman – no, 
it's Patrick the wombat!” (Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992). 
Consequently, rather than reduce singular to descriptive thought, many philosophers have 
proposed to distinguish two varieties of MOP, descriptive and nondescriptive (NMOPs). This 
move promises to address Frege Cases while avoiding descriptivism: Singular thoughts are 
thoughts in which individuals are represented under NMOPs, rather than descriptions. But 
what are NMOPs? 
2. Mental file theory: a possible explanans from philosophy, in need of empirical support 
The mental file theory of singular thought (MFT) claims that NMOPs reduce to mental files, 
which psychologically explain the capacity to entertain singular thoughts. On this view, 
singular thinking just is file-thinking: that the representational vehicles of singular thoughts 
are files is what fundamentally differentiates them from general or descriptive ones.4  
‘Mental files’ are mental representations, whose functions are to refer to some entity, and also 
to collect, store, and render re-accessible information about the entity. A file is structurally 
complex, being composed of the file itself, and a collection of descriptive entries ‘inside’ the 
file, which represent attributes co-predicated of its referent. For example, one’s mental file 
about Patrick might ‘contain’ entries like “is a wombat”, “is from Ballarat”, etc. 
Defenders of MFT conceive of files as independent from the descriptive entries they contain, 
in several respects: 
1) What determines the identity of a file, i.e., makes some representation(s) numerically the 
same/different mental file(s), is not the identity of its entries.  
2) What determines the reference of a file, i.e., files refer through causal, contextual, or 
historical relations, such as what Recanati (2012) calls ‘epistemically rewarding relations’ 
(ERs) as opposed to referring via descriptions. 
3) What determines the entries inside a file, i.e., makes it the case that a certain descriptive 
representation is associated with a certain file, is that, according to Recanati (2012), 
information gets filed together because it is gained through a common ER. 
4) What determines the access to a file, i.e., makes it the case that one retrieves, activates, or 
‘deploys’ a certain file, is not activation of a certain entry inside the file. Files are not 
addressed via their descriptive content. Again, Recanati (2012) claims that ERs rather than 
                                                                                                                                                        
preferring original possessions over perfect duplicates (Hood & Bloom, 2008). 
4
 There are many different versions of MFT, as well as many closely related views (Bach, 1987, 2010; Crane, 
2011; García-Carpintero, 2000; Jeshion, 2010; Lawlor, 2001; Montague, 2011; Perry, 1993; Recanati, 1993, 
2010; Sainsbury, 2005; Sawyer, 2012; Taylor, 2003). The version we focus on in this paper is distinctive in 
taking file-thinking to be constitutively tied to singular thought: Jeshion (2010, p. 132): “Thinking about an 
individual from a mental file is constitutive of singular thinking about that individual”.  Jeshion (2010, p. 129): 
“One thinks a singular thought by thinking through or via a mental file that one has about the particular object. 
By contrast, descriptive thoughts occur discretely in cognition, disconnected from any mental file.”  Recanati 
(2012, p. 13): “the singularist distinction [between singular and descriptive thought] reduces to the distinction 
between two kinds of sense or mode of presentation, descriptive and non-descriptive”. Recanati (2012, p. 34): “A 
non-descriptive mode of presentation, I claim, is nothing but a mental file.”   
 
4 
 
entries play the relevant role: A file’s function is to be deployed so long as the subject stands 
in the appropriate ER to its referent. 
According to MFT, files’ independence from their descriptive entries is what makes them 
especially suited to the NMOP-role. Differences between coreferential singular thoughts are 
explained by numerical differences between coreferential files themselves, rather than 
associated descriptions (entries in files). For example, I can have distinct files/NMOPs for 
Patrick and his qualitatively indistinguishable twin, even if no information inside 
distinguishes them. Since files so conceived can refer to entities which do not satisfy their 
entries, they also address the problems of ignorance, error, and change plaguing descriptivism. 
For example, I can have a file which (persistently) refers to Patrick because its entries 
causally derive from him, even though they depict him as a groundhog named ‘Patricia’, or 
despite the fact that they change as my opinions about him evolve. 
This attractive picture faces a major obstacle. If files are psychologically real, then merely 
sketching an account in which they fit the task-description of essentially singular 
representations a priori is insufficient. What tells us that such files not only exist, but also 
behave the way MFT says, rather than like general files, which refer to properties of kinds 
(Fodor, 2008; Prinz, 2005; Schiffer, 1996), or like descriptive files, whose reference, entries, 
and access are determined by a description (Goodman, forthcoming)? It will not do to respond 
that by ‘mental file’, MFT just means file-like representations that are appropriately singular. 
The issue is not how we use the technical expression ‘mental file’, but whether an empirically 
well-motivated notion in its vicinity can explain or support, rather than merely label, the 
distinction between singular mental representations and general or descriptive ones. 
These objections suggest singular thinking cannot be reduced to file-thinking from the 
armchair. However, this is not a knockdown objection, if MFT is understood as an empirical 
thesis, according to which representations of a certain psychological natural kind, 
traditionally referred to as ‘mental files’, are a posteriori constitutive of our capacity for 
singular thought. Conceptual analysis may not reveal all the “central features of file-hood” 
(Goodman, forthcoming) so understood: some of these features, potentially including 
singularity, may not be deducible from files’ functional-theoretical role. That is one of the 
characteristics of psychological natural kinds. 
2.2 Psychological natural kindhood 
Thoughts not only have contents, which they are about, but also vehicles, which we (our 
brains) think them with: symbolic representations, with ‘formal’ properties in virtue of which 
they play causal-functional roles in the computational processes that constitute thinking.  
 
Each token singular thought has some vehicle, which collectively can be grouped under the 
label ‘singular representations’. From a semantic perspective, these representations serve a 
common semantically-specified function or task: they are for representing individuals 
nondescriptively. But from a formal perspective, is there anything theoretically interesting that 
unites this class of ‘singular representations’, and distinguishes them from descriptive or 
general ones? In other words, do singular representations share distinctive formal properties in 
addition to semantic ones – and if so, which? That is the question a psychological account of 
singular thought must answer. 
 
Representations’ formal properties cannot be determined from the armchair nor directly 
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observed. But they are inferable from characteristic psychological effects. To illustrate the 
relevant notion of ‘effect’, we borrow from Cummins (2010): Consider two mechanisms for 
multiplying. The first multiplies each digit of one factor by each digit of the other then adds 
the results. The second uses successive addition: it computes 3 x 3 as 3 + 3 + 3. The second 
mechanism exhibits the ‘linearity effect’: computational cost is a linear function of multiplier 
size. For example, 3 x 6 requires twice as many operations as 3 x 3, hence takes twice as long. 
The linearity effect is characteristic of the particular means through which the semantically-
specified task of multiplication is accomplished. The effect is incidental to what the 
mechanism does, i.e., to the computation itself. Yet it hints towards how the mechanism 
works, i.e., the nature of the vehicles involved. 
 
As the fact that the linearity effect can be diversely physically implemented suggests, the 
formal properties that interest psychology correspond not to representations’ low-level 
physical (neurophysiological) characteristics, but rather to aspects of their causal-functional 
roles too fine-grained for task analysis to reveal. The fine-grained causal-functional properties 
that empirical research shows to be reliably shared by members of a psychological category 
constitute its signature properties (Carey, 2009). Such properties throw light on the deeper 
nature of the mechanisms which realize a psychological capacity, and so explain it (Cummins, 
2010). 
 
A plausible candidate psychological natural kind is a psychological capacity that exhibits 
many characteristic effects, leading to the discovery of a cluster of signature properties, and 
hinting towards a common set of underlying mechanisms.5 Natural kinds are consequently 
“inductively deep” (Carey, 2009, p. 64): Members have projectible similarities which support 
generalizations. The signatures of a kind may therefore be used to determine its extension a 
posteriori. If certain effects or signatures are absent when a superficially similar task is 
performed, this suggests different psychological mechanisms are involved, and supports a 
‘split’ in psychological classification.  
 
Whether singular representations share a significant cluster of robustly projectible signatures, 
and so constitute a psychological natural kind, is an open question. An analogous question can 
be asked of mental files – representations whose theoretical-functional roles are also specified 
in broad functional-semantic terms by philosophers. As we interpret MFT, it claims that these 
two candidate psychological natural kinds, though distinct at the level of theoretical-
functional role, turn out to exhibit many shared signature properties and effects, so that we are 
a posteriori justified in identifying them at the level of psychological realizers. The proposed 
reduction is local: files are (purportedly) what creatures like us think singularly with, even if 
others think their singular thoughts by other means. This hypothesis requires empirical 
support. 
 
2.3 MFT as an empirical hypothesis concerning a candidate psychological natural kind  
Recently, proponents of MFT6  have appealed to psychological research on ‘object-files’.7 For 
                                                 
5
 Rather than having traditional essences, psychological natural kinds are ‘homeostatic property clusters’, 
groupings of entities which are suitable targets for scientific inquiry because they tend to share many 
interesting properties, which stably co-occur because of some empirically discoverable mechanism rather 
than by accident  (Boyd, 1999; Ereshefsky & Reydon, 2015). 
6
 While many philosophers appeal to some degree to psychology (Dickie, 2010; Jeshion, 2010, 2014; Montague, 
2011; Recanati, 2010; Recanati, 2012, 2013; Sainsbury, 2005), others ignore psychological research entirely 
in their discussions of mental files (Crane, 2011; García-Carpintero, 2000; Hawthorne & Manley, 2012; 
Lawlor, 2001; Schroeter, 2007). 
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example, Jeshion (2010, p. 130) argues that the “essential singularity of mental files ... has its 
basis ... in the singularity of object files”.  Similarly, Recanati has recently defended MFT by 
claiming that he is “making an empirical hypothesis: that the object tracking system which 
exists in perception is used throughout cognition - even in high-level cognition” (Recanati, 
2013, p. 212). 
Object-files are thus supposed to furnish empirical justification not only for the reality, but 
also for the “essential singularity” (Jeshion) of mental files, which task analysis leaves open to 
doubt. However, as both Jeshion and Recanati remark, philosophers' notion of a mental file 
extends psychologists’ notion of object-file. Even supposing object-files are somehow 
essentially singular, why should this property be shared by the broader class of mental files? 
As we reconstruct it, MFT relies on the following projection argument: 
Mental files are a psychological natural kind. Object-files are a representative subspecies of 
the more inclusive kind mental files. Object-files have signature properties which make them 
distinctively singular and file-like, i.e., suited to the role of NMOPs of individuals. Signature 
properties of a representative subspecies of a psychological natural kind project across that 
kind. So, mental files, like object-files, have signature properties which make them 
distinctively singular and file-like. So, we are (empirically, defeasibly) justified in kind-
identifying singular representations – the distinctive vehicles of singular thought – with 
mental files 
To evaluate this argument, the exact relationship between object-files and mental files, and of 
singular thought to both of these, call for careful conceptual and empirical investigation.  
3. Empirical research’s contribution to MFT: Object-files, the standard model of files in 
psychology 
In psychology, object-files are ‘mid-level’ visual representations: They operate between the 
low-level at which basic features such as edges, surfaces, textures, or contours are 
represented, regions are segregated, and figure-ground organization occurs, and the high-level 
at which categorization and recognition take place, and entities fall under semantically 
meaningful classifications such as ‘wombat’ (a general category) or ‘Patrick’ (a familiar 
individual). Between these extremes, object-files are created automatically when certain 
combinations of low-level features corresponding to visual ‘objects’ are encountered by visual 
‘input analyzers’. Files then ‘stick’ to these ‘objects’ as they move and change based primarily 
on their spatiotemporal characteristics, enabling us to track a limited number simply as this or 
that object, while storing and updating information about their features.  
Let us now review some of the effects from which psychologists infer the existence and 
signature properties of object-files (Carey, 2009; Chen, 2012; Dickie, 2010;  Scholl, 2001). 
3.1 Object-based visual attention and memory effects in adults 
Object-files are invoked by vision scientists to account for many effects suggesting that, in 
some sense, representations of ‘objects’ per se are ‘units’ of perception, at various stages: 
                                                                                                                                                        
7
 For example, Kahneman & Treisman (1984), Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs (1992), Scholl (2001), and see 
Section 4. 
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from before selective attention is allocated, to while attention is being deployed (governing its 
spread), to when information enters visual working memory (VWM8).  
Object-files and attention  
A notched circle interpretable as a full circle partially behind a square is hard to locate among 
an array of complete circles and squares. To find it, one must attend serially to the various 
figures in the display. However, a similar figure which is interpreted as in front of a square 
‘pops out’ in visual search (Driver, Davis, Russell, Turatto, & Freeman, 2001; Rensink & 
Enns, 1998). A possible explanation is that, whenever possible, the visual system 
automatically fills in the notched circle so that it appears subjectively as a full cohesive shape, 
even before the subject attends to it, and even if this is detrimental to the search task. This 
suggests that preattentive – hence preconceptual (Dickie, 2010) – processes automatically 
carve up visual scenes into object-like units on the basis of low-level spatiotemporal cues, like 
cohesion. These objects then serve as possible targets for further processing, and for the 
assignment of object-files.  
 
Only a small number of objects can be pre-attentively indexed, and sustain later attentional 
processing, as suggested by the object-based effects exhibited by our capacity to visually 
track moving objects, which is studied using the multiple object tracking (MOT) paradigm 
(Pylyshyn, 2007;  Scholl, 2009). In MOT, subjects see a screen containing 8-12 qualitatively 
identical items (e.g., same-sized white circles). A flashing subset gets selected as targets. Then 
the circles move around unpredictably for around ten seconds. When they stop, subjects have 
to point out the targets. Since targets and distractors are qualitatively similar and move, the 
targets must be tracked on the basis of their spatiotemporal trajectories, rather than features or 
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 VWM is memory in which visual information is actively maintained for ongoing tasks (Luck & Vogel, 2013). 
Illustration 1: Driver et al. 2001 
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fixed locations. Subjects can track only about four objects before performance sharply 
collapses. According to the standard model of object-files, this corresponds to the signature 
maximum number of files initially ‘grabbed’ preattentively by targets, and which can 
subsequently be maintained in parallel (though see below for controversies surrounding this 
interpretation). 
Object-files influence how attention spreads within objects: attention moves faster to a target 
within the same static cohesive object than to an equidistant target outside of it (Egly, Driver, 
& Rafal, 1994; Moore, Stephens, & Hein, 2010) even when object boundaries are task-
irrelevant (Chen & Cave, 2008). 
Attention to objects also affects perception of space, both within objects and between objects. 
Dots appear farther apart inside the same object than when those dots do not appear on the 
same object (Vickery & Chun, 2010). Moreover, attended objects appear closer together than 
unattended objects (Liverence & Scholl, 2011). Allocation of attention via object-files thus 
seems to ‘warp’ how we perceive the surrounding space in which their referents are located.  
 
Object-files and visual working memory (VWM)   
Object-based effects are also observed as attention allocated to objects influences further 
cognitive processing.  Among these ‘downstream’ attentional effects are “object specific 
preview benefits” (OSPBs) (Kahneman et al., 1992; Noles, Scholl, & Mitroff, 2005): 9 In the 
object reviewing paradigm, subjects see a preview display in which visual information is 
associated with objects such as square boxes. One box in the middle of the display on top 
contains, e.g., the letter B. Another box in the middle of the display on the bottom contains an 
S. The letters disappear, the top box moves left, the bottom box moves right, then a letter 
reappears in one of the boxes. When asked to name the letter, subjects are faster when the 
same letter reappears inside the same box: For example, subjects are faster if B reappears in 
the left box rather than the right. Importantly, the locations in which the letters reappear in the 
final display are equidistant from those in which the letters are initially presented. This 
                                                 
9
 Analogous effects occur in the absence of objects, merely on the basis of textures (Ben-Shahar, Scholl, & 
Zucker, 2003). The precise signature of object-files may therefore not be mere preview benefits, but a 
specific level of preview benefits. 
Illustration 2: Vickery & Chun 2010 
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suggests that objects as such cause the priming effect, rather than locations.   
According to the standard object-file model, OSPBs occur when (time-slices of) objects are 
assigned the same object-file on the basis of spatiotemporal factors, enabling faster access to 
entries already in the file. OSPBs thus are effects of object-based attention on retrieval of 
properties from visual memory. 
 
Illustration 3: OSPB, Carey, 2009 
 
Object-files partially determine the capacity of visual working memory (VWM). Evidence 
comes mainly from change-detection experiments (Anderson & Awh, 2012; Luck & Vogel, 
1997, 2013; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001). In these experiments, subjects see a sample 
array of items (e.g., colored shapes), and then after a short retention interval, a test array in 
which they must detect changes (e.g., a blue square has turned red). Subjects are capable of 
remembering only about four features at one time when these are distributed across an equal 
number of objects (four colors of four squares) before performance drops off sharply (five 
colors of five squares). Remarkably however, memory for four features distributed across four 
objects is nearly as good as memory for sixteen features distributed across four objects (four 
objects differing in terms of their colors, orientations, sizes and presence or absence of a 
“gap”). This suggests VWM stores information not in the form of a mere list of features, but 
contains a number of ‘slots’ for object representations in which features are bound together – 
files.10 When the number of objects to be memorized exceeds the available number of slots, 
performance collapses. VWM capacity is thus limited by the number of files stored, 
somewhat independently of their total number of entries. (Though see section 4 for a 
competing explanation.) 
The striking similarity between the nature and size of the capacity limits observed in MOT 
and in VWM has led most psychologists to consider that “object files and VWM [are] simply 
                                                 
10
 This VWM effect could also help distinguish the file model from a standard language of thought (LOT) 
model: To explain the effect, the LOT theorist has to specify – somewhat ad hoc -- that multiply tokening the 
same LOT term (a is F, a is G, a is H) is less costly in memory than tokening different terms in the same 
positions (a is F, b is G, c is H). Files seem to provide a more fitting metaphor for describing memory 
capacity. 
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two terms describing the same system” (Andrew Hollingworth & Rasmussen, 2010, p. 545) 
3.2 More signature  properties of object-files: Triggering and maintenance conditions 
Object reviewing and MOT experiments suggest that the object-file system relies primarily on 
spatiotemporal information to determine when to open a new file and when to assign a pre-
existing file to an element of the visual scene (Flombaum, Scholl, & Santos, 2009; Pylyshyn, 
2007). Though qualitative features sometimes affect how vision ‘decides’ what counts as one 
and the same ‘object’ (Moore et al., 2010), the visual system reliably prioritizes lower-level 
spatiotemporal factors over high-level properties in computations of individuation and 
persistence. For example, in the tunnel effect, if the time it takes stimuli to successively 
appear on either side of an occluder is roughly the time it would take a single object to travel 
behind the occluder (so that the object appears ‘temporally continuous’), and if the object 
appears to have followed a spatially continuous trajectory, viewers experience a single 
persisting object, even when the stimuli have different qualitative properties. For example, a 
yellow square is experienced as ‘morphing’ into a red circle inside the tunnel (Burke, 1952). 
Analogously, in certain cases of apparent motion, subjects experience a succession of brief 
appearances of stationary objects as a single moving object on the basis of the timing and 
location of the flashes, regardless of their superficial features or apparent kinds. For example, 
flipping through a flipbook, subjects see a duck turn into a rabbit (Carey, 2009). Mitroff & 
Alvarez (2007) showed that OSPBs do not occur when objects in the preview and test display 
only share features: They must move on a spatiotemporally connected path (though see, 
Hollingworth & Franconeri, 2009). Plausibly, the various cases in which spatiotemporal 
information trumps competing featural or categorical data to cause the experience of a single 
persisting object all involve a common mechanism: the triggering and maintenance of object-
files on the basis of such information. Supporting this hypothesis, Flombaum & Scholl (2006) 
showed that participants showed better performance on a color detection task for stimuli 
which respected spatiotemporal continuity compared to those which did not. Similarly, Odic, 
Roth, & Flombaum (2012) found that OSPBs line up with apparent motion effects.  
Spatiotemporal priority, i.e., the fact that the visual system relies primarily on the 
spatiotemporal histories of objects to individuate them, is thus a “fundamental principle of 
object persistence” in vision (Flombaum et al., 2009), conformity to which is widely 
considered a signature property of object-files. Among the spatiotemporal constraints 
hardwired into the visual system’s file-maintenance parameters, apart from spatiotemporal 
continuity (i.e. that objects move on connected, unobstructed paths) there is also the principle 
of cohesion (i.e. that objects move as connected and bounded wholes). When these principles 
are violated both MOT and OSPB are disrupted. For example, in MOT, subjects fail to track 
“stuffs” (such as water or sand) that move in characteristically substance-like ways (by 
pouring from one location to another) (Van Marle & Scholl, 2003). Likewise, when two 
objects merge into one, OSPB for only is observed, suggesting OSPB is sensitive to violations 
of cohesion (Mitroff, Scholl, & Wynn, 2004). 
3.3 Object-based effects in infants 
Infants have likely innate expectations about the behavior of physical objects, whose content 
is studied using violation of expectation and looking-time paradigms (Baillargeon, 1995; 
Carey, 2009; Spelke, 1990). This initial ‘knowledge’ of objects and their behaviors present 
many parallels with adults' object-files (Scholl & Leslie, 1999). 
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Signature capacity-limits 
Infants’ object representations are capacity-limited in similar ways to object-files: Infants are 
able to represent and maintain in memory only a small set of objects. They remember up to 
three objects stored in a container, but their performance collapses at more than four, which 
they do not even distinguish from more than two (Feigenson & Carey, 2005).  
Triggering and maintenance conditions  
In the individuation and tracking of objects, infants under 10-months privilege spatiotemporal 
information over property and kind information (Carey & Xu, 2001; Xu & Carey, 1996). For 
example, infants are shown a toy duck on top of a car. When a hand pulls on the duck’s head, 
the car comes along with it. Unlike adults, infants are not surprised by this, suggesting that 
they fail to draw on kind-relevant qualitative differences to individuate static objects. In 
another of Carey and Xu's experiments, 10-month-olds see two stimuli appear successively 
from behind each side of an occluder, which differ in kind (a ball and a cup) or features (a red 
and a blue ball). This could be interpreted either as the ball changing (color or into a cup), or 
as two different objects successively appearing. Ten month olds expect one object behind the 
occluder, thus prioritizing spatiotemporal information in computing object persistence. 
 
Illustration 4: Xu & Carey 1996, Carey 2009  
 
Similarly to object-files, infants' object representations are maintained on the basis of 
principles such as continuity and cohesion. Infants are surprised when an object does not 
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appear in the middle gap between two occluders while traveling behind them (Luo & 
Baillargeon, 2005), thus violating spatiotemporal continuity. Violations of cohesion such as 
simply splitting a cracker in two disrupt infants' ability to track objects (Cheries, Mitroff, 
Wynn, & Scholl, 2008).  Likewise, analogously to adult MOT, seeing piles of sand being 
poured from one location to another instead of moving as rigid unified wholes disrupts 
infants' ability to track small sets of objects (Huntley-Fenner, Carey, & Solimando, 2002). The 
object/substance distinction appears in infancy (Rips & Hespos, 2015) and is uninfluenced by 
cultural factors (Cacchione et al., 2014). 
Summing up, according to the standard model of object-files in psychology, they constitute a 
psychological natural kind, a universal, domain-specific, innate, hardwired, and evolutionarily 
ancient core system (Carey, 2009; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007) for which there is converging 
evidence from independent sources. The main signatures of object-files are hypothesized to be 
as follows (Carey, 2009; Scholl, 2001):  
1. Signature object-based effects on attention and memory, in particular object-based 
preview benefits and capacity limits. 
2. Signature triggering and maintenance conditions, in particular, prioritization of 
spatiotemporal factors over featural cues in computations of individuation (initial 
opening of a file) and persistence (whether the same file ‘sticks’ diachronically to an 
encountered element).  
3. Signature referential domain of ‘Spelke objects’, obeying principles of continuity, 
cohesion and contact. 
 
4. Do object-files support MFT? 
Object-files are often claimed to support a central negative claim of MFT. Supposedly, object-
files empirically contradict a view of perception descriptivists assume, according to which 
perception represents only arrays of qualitative features scattered in space. On this view, 
individuals must be posited quasi-theoretically, as the hypothetical possessors of such-and-
such immediately visible and epistemically transparent qualities, so object representation 
requires the sophisticated conceptual apparatus that goes with language and quantification. 
According to the object-file model, on the contrary, perception divides the world into objects 
prior to conceptualization, and offers them up as potential targets for thought. Object-files 
thus undercut the empirical basis for descriptivism in perception (Burge, 2010; Burnston & 
Cohen, 2012; Dickie, 2010; Pylyshyn, 2007). 
 
In addition, object-files may be taken to support MFT's positive claims. Indeed, object-files 
have two main characteristics which arguably make them fit the bill for distinctively singular 
representations: First, unlike putative general files, object-files refer to objects. Even if the 
precise sense in which we should understand ‘objects’ in this context remains controversial, 
the function of object-files is (arguably) not to represent attributes or kinds (like wombat-hood 
or cuteness, nor even Spelke objecthood11). Second, unlike putative descriptive files, object-
                                                 
11
 In the past, object-files have sometimes been presented as mental analogs of the general sortal concept ‘object’ 
(Xu, 2007). However, object-files on their own do not appear to support purely general or quantificational 
thoughts about objects as a category, such as the thought that there are many objects in Ballarat.  We 
therefore grant MFT the now widespread view that object-files serve to represent token-objects, not the 
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files refer nondescriptively.12 The signature triggering and maintenance conditions of object-
files, based on principles like spatiotemporal priority, give some substance to the idea that 
files are nondescriptive. It thus seems plausible to appeal to object-files as a species of 
singular representations, and to claim they fill the role of NMOPs for demonstrative thoughts 
about objects. 
 
However, before we fully endorse this important premise in MFT’s projection argument, it is 
worth noting that the standard model of object-files is currently more controversial than 
philosophers acknowledge. This is doubly important to MFT. First, if all the characteristic 
effects associated with object-files are better explained without them, then the case for the 
psychological reality of mental files collapses. Secondly, if the standard picture of object-files 
is mistaken, object-files might exist, but fail to support MFT, by not being suitably singular or 
NMOP-like. 
Are capacity limits file-based? A first area of ongoing debate concerns the nature and 
explanation of capacity limits in attention and memory. Understanding these limits simply in 
terms of a “magical number four” (Cowan, 2001) corresponding to the fixed maximal number 
of files available at one time is an oversimplification. Tracking capacity is affected by factors 
other than number of targets, such as objects’ speed (Alvarez & Franconeri, 2007; Horowitz & 
Cohen, 2010; Howard & Holcombe, 2008), the distance between them (Franconeri, Jonathan, 
& Scimeca, 2010; Holcombe, Chen, & Howe, 2014; Scimeca & Franconeri, 2015), or the 
visual hemifield in which they appear (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2005). This has led some 
psychologists to investigate alternative models of tracking capacity which do not posit an 
object-based bottleneck. For instance, some claim tracking is a serial process involving a 
combination of a high-capacity iconic memory and a roaming attentional spotlight (Holcombe 
& Chen, 2013; Oksama & Hyönä, 2004; Tripathy, Ogmen, & Narasimhan, 2011). Others 
propose that MOT capacity is determined by the flexible allocation of a continuous resource, 
which can variably spread across the entire scene, rather than a discrete number of files 
(Alvarez & Franconeri, 2007; Franconeri, Alvarez, & Cavanagh, 2013) or that it is entirely 
explained by spatial factors like crowding (Franconeri et al., 2010). 
Similarly, VWM capacity does not depend solely on how many object-representations are 
deployed: We can remember fewer objects as their ‘costliness’ (featural complexity) 
increases. Again, it has been proposed that what accounts for VWM limits is how much of a 
continuous resource is being expended, not how many discrete file-slots are filled (Alvarez & 
Cavanagh, 2004; Steven L. Franconeri et al., 2013; Scimeca & Franconeri, 2015).  
                                                                                                                                                        
object-type as such (Carey, 2009; Marcus, 2001; Scholl & Leslie, 1999) 
12
 Descriptivists could object that object-files depend on some property representations, namely the 
representation of objects’ spatiotemporal properties, such as cohesion, rigidity, etc.  As Burge (2010, p. 455) 
puts it, discussing Pylyshyn’s FINST model: “Properties like spatial boundedness, spatial integrity, and 
continuity in motion are properties whose representation guides indexes for bodies."  A radical anti-
descriptivist response would be to maintain that the spatiotemporal properties which lead object-files to be 
opened and enable them to “stick” to visual elements diachronically are not – or need not – be represented: 
The instantiation of the appropriate properties simply causally triggers non-representational brain 
mechanisms which output and maintain object-files. The level of object-files would be where 
representational explanation bottoms out in brute causal explanation (Pylyshyn, 2007) A more moderate view 
would be to grant that there is some sense in which the lower-level properties the object-filing system 
responds to are represented, yet emphasize that they are only represented within the visual module: what 
makes an object the referent of an object-file is not its falling under concepts corresponding to Spelke 
principles, like the concept cohesive. For recent discussion, see for example (Orlandi, 2014). 
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Should this lead us to doubt the reality of object-files? Not necessarily. What matters for the 
object-file model, and consequently for MFT, is that attention and memory capacities be at 
least partly defined in terms of objects, not that the number of objects be absolutely fixed or 
that no other factors matter. For example, mixed models according to which these capacities 
depend both on allocation of some spreadable resource and the number of objects seem well 
supported (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Anderson & Awh, 2012; Hardman & Cowan, 2014; 
Luck & Vogel, 2013; Xu & Chun, 2009). VWM capacity could be the product of an 
interaction between object-slots and costliness of features, while tracking capacity could 
depend on both the number of targets and their speed, distance, or other factors. For example, 
in the case of VWM, it may be that while in many circumstances the number of files available 
is four, this number changes depending on how difficult the features inside the files are to 
remember. For complex features, the number of available files may drop to two. Nevertheless, 
if the object limit is two instead of three, participants will now be better at remembering three 
features per object for two objects than two features per object for three objects. At any set 
level of featural complexity, there are still some object-based limits on memory (this is an 
empirical testable hypothesis). Object-based limits in tracking may work in an analogous 
fashion (this is an area for future experimental inquiry). This is enough to support some 
version of the object-file model, if not the oversimplified one in which there are exactly four 
files.  
Are individuals per se being tracked? Some psychologists deny that MOT involves the 
representation of objects as individuals. This objection is especially relevant to the claim that 
object-files fill the demonstrative NMOP-role. The source of the objection is the finding that 
if individual names (or other identifying characteristics) are assigned to each of the targets 
before they start to move, subjects find it near impossible, when they stop, to say which target 
has which name. For example, supposing one of the targets was initially baptized ‘Pat’, 
subjects cannot single out Pat at the end of the task. Subjects only know whether a given 
object is a target, not which target it is (Pylyshyn, 2004; Scholl, 2009). 
Scholl (2009, p. 57) argues this should lead us to question “one of the key assumptions about 
MOT …  that each target object is being tracked as a distinct individual: during tracking one 
is keeping track of this target, that target, and that target as each moves about the display”. 
Thus, whereas Pylyshyn takes MOT to show that object-files are linked to objects thanks to 
some pre-attentive mechanism analogous to pointing fingers, Scholl (ibid.) retorts that this “is 
essentially equivalent to tracking two objects by continually pointing to one with each index 
finger, but then later having no idea which object you were initially pointing to with your left 
index finger!”. In philosophical terms, this would correspond to either a violation of Frege’s 
Constraint, or to a violation of the Transparency Constraint on MOPs: either representing an 
object under the same/different files would not amount to representing it as the same/different 
object from the subject’s perspective, or subjects would be incapable of knowing, purely 
introspectively, whether they are representing an object under the same or different 
MOPs/files (at least diachronically13).  On Scholl's alternative picture MOT simply requires 
ordinary multifocal attention, which need not distinguish its different foci as separate 
individuals.  
                                                 
13
 It is sometimes claimed that transparency only holds synchronically. However, one of the central historical 
philosophical motivations for files was clearly to account for continued belief (Perry, 1980). Furthermore, 
even philosophers who reject diachronic transparency maintain that file-identity is transparent during a single 
exercise of the same tracking capacity (Campbell, 1987; Recanati, 2012) which lack of transparency during a 
single episode of MOT contradicts. 
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Scholl's objection to Pylyshyn's model seriously threatens MFT. Yet several points are worth 
noting in response. First, even if Scholl's argument tells against Pylyshyn's claim that tracking 
involves pre-attentive indexing, it actually does not matter so much to the object-files model if 
tracking requires attention after all, so long as it does not require the deployment of 
descriptive conceptual resources stored in long-term memory – which does not seem to be the 
case. Second, it is unclear why the incapacity to remember, e.g., a name associated with a 
target at the end of a MOT experiment means that the object is not being tracked as an 
individual: in this context, names function as yet another predicative property (entry) inside 
files, which we know subjects are poor at remembering during tracking anyway (Bahrami, 
2003). Roughly, an object-file based demonstrative thought would have the structure ‘that is 
Pat’, with ‘is Pat’ serving as a file-entry. Our incapacity to re-access individuating properties 
may pose a threat to the claim that entries inside object-files are stably stored throughout 
MOT, but it does not refute the claim that tracking involves singular reference. Thirdly, 
variants on MOT have been increasingly studied to test competing models of tracking. Among 
these is Multiple Identity Tracking (MIT), in which the task is not simply to locate several 
indistinguishable targets but rather distinct individuals, e.g., the (only) wombat among 
animals of other species (Oksama & Hyönä, 2008; Pinto, Howe, Cohen, & Horowitz, 2010). 
Results suggest that subjects can keep track of the individualizing characteristics of objects in 
more ecologically valid situations. In sum, for the purpose of the standard object-file model, 
what really matters is that subjects have the capacity to track at least some individuals without 
relying on conceptualizations of their properties. And that much remains empirically 
plausible, regardless of exactly how we explain standard MOT. 
Are object-files transparent? Although ordinary MOT might not show a violation of the 
Transparency Constraint, other empirical results suggest that, unlike MOPs, object-files are 
not always present transparently to consciousness.14 In an experiment (Mitroff, Scholl, & 
Wynn, 2005), subjects saw an ambiguous display, in which objects are perceived either as 
streaming through or bouncing off each other. When the display was manipulated so subjects 
consciously saw streaming, OSPBs were still observed in the opposite bouncing direction. 
Mitroff et al. (2005, p. 67) conclude that “conscious percepts of 'which went where' in 
dynamic ambiguous displays can diverge from the mapping computed by the object-file 
system.” Thus, object-file identity may not always be available to subjects consciously and 
transparently. Converging evidence is provided by (Norman, Heywood, & Kentridge, 2013): 
Adapting Egly et al. (1994)’s demonstration of object-based attention, these authors showed 
that targets are processed faster within the boundaries of an object of which a signal-detection 
task indicates subjects are unconscious.  
Though the fact that object-files do not always line up with conscious percepts should not 
prevent us from tying object-files to conscious perception in most cases, it nevertheless makes 
it doubtful whether transparency is among object-files’ signature properties as a kind. More 
broadly, file-based explanations and Fregean ones involving MOPs have different aims: While 
the former focus on capturing subjects’ rational personal-level perspectives, the latter use 
(unconscious) effects to identify subpersonal mechanisms.15 It is therefore not surprising that 
                                                 
14
 For example, Peacocke (2001, p. 253) writes: “the way in which some thing ... is given in the nonconceptual 
content of an experience is something which contributes to what it is like to have that experience. These ways 
which feature in nonconceptual content are then at the conscious, personal level, and are not merely 
subpersonal. As features of the subjective experience, their presence can entitle a thinker to make a particular 
judgement, or to form a certain belief.” See also (Campbell, 2011) 
15
 As Hollingworth & Rasmussen (2010, p. 543) put it: “it is important to consider that the original object 
reviewing paradigm of Kahneman et al. (1992) did not probe conscious perception; all that was measured 
was priming. Thus, claims regarding the updating of memory with motion need not be inextricably bound 
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object-files should violate Fregean constraints. Nevertheless, defenders of MFT can respond 
by pointing out that transparency is best construed as a normative claim, and that violations of 
transparency are abnormal. If object-files normally line up with perceptual MOPs, that might 
be good enough for MFT: on a view of natural kinds as homeostatic property clusters, even 
highly projectible properties may be absent in sufficiently deviant contexts. Whether or not 
transparency violations are indeed exceptional is an empirical issue. 
In summary, the premise that object-files exist and are singular has evidence in its favour. 
While object-files might not behave exactly like NMOP-role fillers, the mismatches are 
(arguably) tolerable: a posteriori reductions are seldom perfectly smooth. Other parts of 
MFT’s projection argument remain problematic. MFT faces the problem of range.  
 
5. The problem of range for MFT 
Mental files cannot be modeled too closely on object-files, or they fail to account for all 
singular thoughts (for reasons given below). But if mental files are made to depart too much 
from object-files, this guts the notion of empirical substance, and weakens the grounds for 
projecting properties of object-files to mental files more generally.  
To avoid the first horn of this dilemma, the notion of ‘mental file’ must be extensive enough 
to account for all singular thoughts. To avoid the second, it must be sufficiently restricted to 
bear a clear kinship to ‘object-files’. This is the problem of range for MFT. It manifests in two 
ways. 
5.1 The problem of referential range: Object-files are for objects 
The first aspect of the problem concerns referential (or categorial) range. One of the 
signatures of object-files is that they target Spelke objects (henceforth ‘objects’)16.  Yet the 
entities we think singularly about (‘individuals’) are not all objects, but a motley crew – from 
deities to cake-delivering businesses (Jeshion, 2010; Kim, 1977). Many fail to conform to 
Spelke principles or the stereotype of “middle-sized dry goods” (Austin, 1964; Bloom, 2002; 
Hansen & Rey, forthcoming). It is for example unclear how object-files could account for 
thoughts about the following: animate agents (Patrick, a snake), undetached body parts (a 
snout), non-existent and fictional entities (Santa Claus), events (the writing of this chapter), 
locations (Ballarat), times (now), situations (the actual world), ‘minor’ entities (Patrick’s 
shadow), ephemera (bubbles), very large or small individuals (the Great Barrier Reef), 
surfaces or backgrounds (the sky), collections or groups (a wisdom of wombats), abstract 
individuals (the number seven, the Wombat Preservation Society), paths and trajectories (the 
route from here to Ballarat), mental states (this pain), oneself, and objects made up of 
disconnected parts (disassembled watches). 
The problem of referential range is thus the following: The signature domain-specificity of 
object-files supports MFT to the extent that it gives empirical substance to the claim that real 
files are for representing immediately perceptible objects as opposed to attributes or kinds. 
But this blessing is also a curse. Object-files’ referential domain is too narrow. The challenge 
is to account for singular thoughts about individuals that are not immediately perceptible or 
not objects, hence not covered by object-files, without ceasing to employ a notion of ‘file’ 
                                                                                                                                                        
with claims regarding conscious perception.” 
16
 “[T]he capacities infants have are not tracking mechanisms but rather object-tracking mechanisms.” (Bloom, 
1998, p. 67) 
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which picks out representations of the same psychological natural kind.  
5.2 Extending files’ referential range: The horizontal extension of files (within perception)  
To extend files horizontally is to claim that there are more species of files at the pre-
conceptual, mid-level perception than merely object-files. More precisely, the claim is that 
there are core representations which closely resemble object-files formally: They cause 
similar downstream effects on memory or attention, and have signature triggering and 
maintenance conditions, corresponding to specific ways of singling out individuals 
independently of higher-level descriptive classification. Yet these representations are not 
object-files, and their dedicated domain is not that of objects. These additional species of file 
could help MFT explain demonstrative thoughts about immediately perceptible entities that 
are not objects. 
Superficially, horizontal extension of files resembles MFT’s usual multiplication of files. But 
it differs in substance and method. In substance, because it is compatible with files only 
existing in perception; in method, because it is grounded on empirical evidence that other 
representations share object-files’ signatures. For reasons of space, we present just one 
illustrative application of this strategy: We argue that mid-level perception includes event-
files, which ground demonstrative thinking about (some) particular visual events as events.  
5.3 Event-files 
 
To represent an event, one usually represents an object participating in it.17 It does not follow 
that event representation requires descriptive conceptualization or language. Indeed, recent 
empirical evidence suggests that just as there are representations of individual objects in core 
cognition, there are also representations of individual events18: event-files (Hommel, 199819, 
2004; Shipley, 2008) “The ongoing experience of events ending and beginning would then 
correspond to the opening and closing of such files” (Shipley, 2008, p. 21) Defenders of MFT 
have so far ignored this species of file.  
 
Imagine a situation where someone grabs a pen, clicks it, writes, and puts it down. Although 
the stretch of time in which this happens is continuous, we tend to view this scenario in terms 
of four discrete units (subsequently combinable into one larger one). In an early experiment, 
Newtson and Engquist (1976) had participants view videos and press a button wherever they 
felt like "one meaningful unit of activity has ended and another one has begun." Participants 
generally agreed as to where event boundaries lie, suggesting some common mechanism 
could underlie event segmentation. Further research suggests this mechanism is perceptual, 
by showing that event segmentation is largely automatic, and has an important role in on-line 
processes of visual memory and attention (Radvansky & Zacks, 2011). 
 
Event-files & attention. Event boundaries, like those of objects, play a major – though 
complicated – role in structuring attention. While the adult visual system seems better at 
detecting small interruptions at event boundaries (Newtson & Engquist, 1976), subjects are 
worse at detecting visual probes appearing at event boundaries (Huff, Papenmeier, & Zacks, 
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 Yet one can see a shimmering or a lightening, without there being some object that shimmers or lightens. 
18
 For the purpose of this section, we treat actions as a subspecies of events. 
19
 Hommel appears to be the originator of the concept. However, he uses it differently than we do: Very roughly, 
he seems to consider an event-file to be simply an object-file which stores action-relevant features (like 
affordances). 
18 
 
2012). 
Event-files and memory. Further supporting the analogy between event representations and 
object-files, individual event representations structure automatic processes of VWM. For 
example, memory for scenes or moments from an event improves at the boundaries (Swallow, 
Zacks, & Abrams, 2009) and when observers view videos depicting human interactions with 
simple everyday objects, memory for items from an ongoing video is superior when no event 
boundary occurs between presentation and test compared to a case in which such a boundary 
does occur, even when the temporal delay between stimulus and test is controlled for 
(Swallow et al., 2009). These findings indicate that event representations are on-going 
constructs in working memory whose contents are ‘cleared-out’ once a segmentation point is 
encountered. 
Event representations determine the capacity to remember distinct events in a manner 
strikingly reminiscent of the signature capacity limits of object-files. Wood (2007) presented 
observers with between one and five brief sequences depicting continuous human motions 
(e.g. a person raising an arm). After exposure, participants were shown a second sequence in 
which all the actions were identical to those presented during exposure or in which one of the 
actions had changed (e.g. a person raising a leg instead of raising an arm). The participants’ 
task was to indicate whether the second set of actions was the same or different from the first. 
  
Wood found that we can only store representations of about two or three separate events in 
working memory at once. Importantly, these memory limitations cannot be explained by 
overall duration of activity, overall amount of movement, or other working memory 
constraints like object-based limits (thus clearly distinguishing these representations from 
object-files). Strikingly, observers were as good at remembering three properties distributed 
across three events (e.g. each event having a unique action category) as they were at 
remembering nine properties distributed across nine events (e.g. each event having a duration, 
category, and side of the body). But they were worse at remembering four properties for four 
events than nine properties for three events. These results strongly suggest that the capacity 
for visual memory is (at least partially) measured by representations which it makes excellent 
sense to conceive of as ‘event-files’, given the clear analogy with the VWM effects studied by 
Luck & Vogel. 
 
Triggering & maintenance conditions. Since event representations, like object-files, are 
activated reflexively during perception, it is natural to ask which specific visual cues trigger 
their activation, and whether these mirror those in object perception. 
 
Many such parallels exist. While objects are perceived as cohesive units in space with clear 
boundaries defined by object contours, events are perceived as cohesive units in timewith 
clear boundaries defined by moments of salient change (Zacks & Swallow, 2007). 
 
Recent evidence shows that cohesion constraints on event representations induce false 
memories for events due to processes that mirror object-based amodal completion. Thus 
Strickland & Keil (2011) showed participants videos depicting a causal event (e.g., a person 
kicking a soccer ball) and a series of pictures after the event. In the crucial conditions, the 
video was edited in such a way that the moment of contact between foot and ball was missing. 
Participants nevertheless reported having seen this contact when it was heavily implied by 
subsequent video footage (e.g. when the participant viewed the resulting flight of the ball) but 
not when contact was not implied (e.g. when the participant viewed irrelevant footage from 
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the same scene). It also appears that preverbal infants make such causal bridging inferences. 
For example, pre-verbal infants around 10-months spontaneously infer the unseen causes of 
visible effects even for highly unfamiliar events (Saxe, Tenenbaum, & Carey, 2005). 
 
Pursuing the analogy to objects, continuity also appears to be an important triggering 
condition for event representations. In Magliano and Zack’s (2011) FMRI study, the authors 
contrasted videos which were edited in ways that involved (a) no discontinuities, (b) 
spatial/temporal discontinuities which maintained event continuity or (c) event discontinuities 
which maintained spatial/temporal continuity. Event discontinuities disrupted segmentation 
behavior more than spatial/temporal discontinuities, and event discontinuities provoked a 
unique pattern of neural responses which differed substantially from videos containing no 
discontinuity, and videos containing only spatial/temporal discontinuities. 
 
In summary, empirical evidence suggests that the visual system automatically parses the flow 
of time into discrete representations of individual events, that then go on to structure attention 
and memory analogously to object-files. There is thus reason to posit event-files, another 
subspecies of file in core cognition alongside object-files, which could account for 
demonstrative thoughts about certain basic visual events. 
Furthering the horizontal extension? We have proposed that there are at least two file-systems 
within core cognition, belonging to the same psychological natural kind but underlying 
distinct modes of singular reference to different domains: object-files and event-files. The 
problem of referential range is far from solved. But perhaps the same horizontal extension 
strategy could be pursued for other categories of individuals.20 For example, (Murez & 
Smortchkova, 2014) argue for the existence of ‘agent-files’, which account for demonstrative 
thoughts about animates agents (which they argue are cognitively distinct from objects). 
(Tsompanidis, 2015) argues for files that represent moments of time.21 Whether mid-level 
perception contains these or yet other species of files is an open issue. We turn to another 
aspect of the problem of range, not solved by the postulation of files for non-objects in 
perception. 
6. The problem of cognitive range: Object-files are not concepts 
Singular thoughts are not all demonstrative. They also include thoughts of at least the 
following three varieties: 
Memory-based thoughts. Sitting at your desk, you think freely about Patrick. Yet nothing 
impinging your senses relates to him. One can thus form conscious, singular occurrent 
judgements simply by activating singular standing beliefs stored in long-term memory.  
                                                 
20
 Boyer (1998, pp. 67-68) suggests that “domain specificity could start at a low level of processing, that of 
“tracking” same-substance cues. Representing two faces as the same person with different emotions would 
activate cognitive resources entirely different from those involved in recognizing two sheep as same kind … 
Note that this does not imply a return to the view that having a concept is having a description. All that is 
required is that (1) objects are assigned to ontological domains on the basis of perceptual cues … (2) this 
makes the system attend to or expect “same substance” information in a way that is specific to the domain.”  
21
 More radically, Millikan (1998, 2000) argues that files are involved in nondescriptive thoughts about all 
“substances”, a category that includes not only individuals of various sorts, but also stuffs (like milk) and 
“real kinds” (like wombats). However, empirical evidence for her view is somewhat lacking. 
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Communication-based thoughts. You entertain singular thoughts about Patrick despite having 
only ever read about him. This illustrates the capacity to form singular thoughts about 
individuals simply by understanding utterances or texts about them.  
Recognitional thoughts. You repeatedly recognize some individual, encountered under a 
variety of perspectives, as Patrick – one and the same individual across various contexts.  
Such thoughts are to various degrees perceptually detached. By contrast, object-files are 
encapsulated.22 Consider again the tunnel effect. One might experience a ball as changing into 
a cup, while judging that no object actually transformed. Even when this squarely contradicts 
our firmly-held rational beliefs, object-files make us “irresistibly perceive” (Flombaum & 
Scholl, 2006, p. 840) objects as the same, so long as they obey certain constraints, which are 
similarly hardwired into the visual systems of newborn chickens (Rugani, Fontanari, Simoni, 
Regolin, & Vallortigara, 2009)23. 
Like domain-specificity, this signature of object-files cuts both ways for MFT. On the one 
hand, it supports the claim that real files are nondescriptive: The properties which trigger and 
maintain them are only represented within dedicated low-level ‘input-analyzers’, if at all. On 
the other hand, sensitivity to logical reasoning or theoretical beliefs is one of the markers of 
singular concepts and MOPs.24 MFT claims files explain the cognitive significance of singular 
terms in natural language, such as indexicals or proper names (Lockwood 1974, Bach 1987, 
Recanati 2012, Evans 1982, Forbes 1989, Jeshion 2009, 2010). To fill these roles, files must 
feature in higher-level, language-based cognition, where rational or logical norms apply. This 
gives rise to the problem of cognitive (or conceptual) range: (Purported) conceptual files are 
unlike object-files in many ways. Notions of ‘file’ lumping them together risk being too 
inclusive, not only to cut psychological reality at the joints, but also to demarcate singular 
from general or descriptive thought.  
Defenders of MFT see this less as a problem than as an opportunity to distinguish multiple 
subspecies of files: For example, Recanati (2012) posits re-deployable ‘recognitional files’ to 
account for recognitional thoughts, and ‘encyclopedic files’, to account for memory-based 
thoughts. Jeshion (2010) posits files based on ‘mental names’. Such files’ continuity with 
object-files is emphasized. Jeshion (2010, 2014) claims object-files smoothly develop 
ontogenetically into mental files based on ‘mental names’, and Recanati (2013: REF) 
hypothesizes (recall) that “the object tracking system which exists in perception is used 
throughout cognition - even in high-level cognition”. 
Proponents of MFT have not confronted a competing model psychologists take seriously, 
which stresses the discontinuity between the object-file system, and what is considered a 
distinct higher-level system for individuating and tracking individuals based on beliefs about 
properties and kinds (Carey, 2009; Carey & Xu, 2001). This second system is what one would 
rely on to judge, for example, that although a ball appears to have turned into a cup behind an 
occluder, these objects are really distinct. According to Carey & Xu (2001, p. 203) “once this 
second system of kind-based object individuation has become available, it creates the 
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 The object-file system does not take subjects’ inferential reasoning or theoretical beliefs as inputs.  
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 The same point applies to synchronous object individuation. For example, no matter how convinced someone 
is by the metaphysical principle according to which any mereological sum of objects whatsoever composes 
another object, their object-file system will not assign a single file to, e.g., the sum of Patrick + Eiffel Tower. 
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 As Prosser (2005, p. 370) puts it:  “What is essential to MOPs is that they are individuated in such a way as to 
make maximum rational sense of the thinking subject.”    
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representations that articulate thought. That is, it preempts object file representations in our 
experiences of the world.” On this model, files occupy a circumscribed area of cognition. 
Rather than outgrow core cognition during development, they are superseded by 
representations of a different kind.25  
To decide between these competing models, we empirically investigate the relevant empirical 
literature for MFT's hypothesis according to which files constitute a unified psychological 
natural kind, extending beyond mid-level perception into higher-level singular thought, i.e., 
the vertical extension of files. 
7. Vertical extension of files (beyond perception) 
Two types of empirical arguments for the vertical extension of files are worth considering. 
Firstly, there could be direct evidence that representations in higher-level cognition have 
analogous signatures to object-files. Secondly, there could be more indirect evidence, such as 
developmental or evolutionary connections between them.  
7.1 Direct evidence 
Signature capacity limits 
Capacity limits are a signature of object-files that philosophers mostly ignore in 
characterizing mental files.26 Could an empirical case be made for files in higher-level 
cognition based on capacity limits?  
Kamp (1984) and Recanati (2005) speculate that information used to interpret context-
sensitive expressions such as indexicals is available in the same format regardless whether it 
is acquired through previous discourse or perception. Recanati hints at an argument for this 
hypothesis based on signature capacity limits. He gives the following case: 
 
Yesterday, my brother talked to the policeman about the burglar we saw. He told him he thought he had escaped, 
but the policeman would not believe him, arguing that someone was awake, and he would have seen the burglar 
if he had left.  
This is supposed to suggest that verbal working memory – and more specifically, the capacity 
to keep track of the identities of highly salient singular referents of anaphoric pronouns 
(underlined) – displays the same signature limit as visual working memory/attention found in 
MOT.  
                                                 
25
 It should be noted that object-files are described as ‘concepts’ by some psychologists (Carey, 2009; Spelke, 
1990), roughly because they are multimodal (Jordan, Clark, & Mitroff, 2010) and available as input to action 
planning. But the disagreement with the discontinuist view is only apparent, since this notion of ‘concept’ is 
less demanding than the way in which ‘concept’ is used in philosophy, roughly for representations that are 
inferentially promiscuous and MOP-like. The point that core representations are distinct from the constituents 
of higher-level beliefs, including folk theories, is indeed central to the work of the same psychologists who 
describe them as ‘concepts’. For example, Carey & Spelke (1996, p. 519) note that:  “theories are always 
open to revision, including radical revision including conceptual change or even abandonment. Core systems, 
in contrast, are elaborated but not revised.” 
26
 For example, Fodor (2008, p. 94) writes: “Think of your head as containing (inter alia) an arbitrarily large 
filing cabinet, which can in turn contain an arbitrarily large set of files.”  Although Fodor references 
Kahneman, Treisman and Pylyshyn as the source of this usage of ‘file’, it is not clear what indefinitely 
storable and numerous ‘files’ have to do with object-files, which are essentially limited in number and short-
lived (Noles, Scholl, & Mitroff, 2005). 
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A similar view has been independently proposed in psychology by Cowan (2001) who claims 
that the ‘magical number four’ sometimes considered a signature of object-files actually 
reflects a central limit on attention. Another theorist who has defended a similar view is 
Hurford (2003) who draws a parallel between MOT capacity limits and linguistic deixis, 
noting that few languages have more than five contrasting deictics. According to such views, 
files are in central cognition, rather than confined to specialized core systems. 
Taken literally, however, the hypothesis according to which files underlie a unified system for 
referent-tracking in perception and discourse predicts that holding verbal items in WM 
interferes with visual MOT or WM tasks. This prediction is not corroborated: Luck & Vogel 
(1997) found no effect of verbal load on their visual WM task. And tracking four objects in 
MOT while remembering four verbally presented items is trivial (Scholl & Xu, 2001).  
In response to this objection, the hypothesis can be interpreted less narrowly: There could be 
several separate filing systems – verbal, visual, and modality unspecific, perhaps – with 
analogous capacity-limits. Scholl and Xu (2001) raise a conceptual challenge to this proposal: 
The central limit posited by Cowan and others, supposing it exists, is defined over associative 
chunks, a notion far less constrained than ‘file’. More generally, even if capacity-limits in 
higher-level cognition were shown to be numerically similar to limits in core object cognition, 
evidence that these limits are defined in terms of files and not other information structures is 
needed. 
One area where this challenge might be taken up is semantic memory, which exhibits the ‘fan 
effect’ (Anderson & Reder, 1999): the more (recently learned) facts one knows involving a 
concept (associations ‘fanning off’ from it), the harder it is to retrieve any one of these facts. 
More significant for our purposes is the differential fan effect (Radvansky, 1999): the strength 
of the fan effect depends on the concepts and facts involved. For example, it is harder to 
retrieve facts about a single object in many different large locations (‘the palm is in the hotel’, 
‘the palm is in the library’, ‘the palm is in the school’), than facts about a single location with 
different objects (‘the palm is in the hotel’, ‘the phone is in the hotel’, ‘the plate is in the 
hotel’). For pairs of small locations (that can contain just one person) and people, the effect is 
reversed: it is easier to remember one person in several locations, than several people in one 
location. Radvansky interprets these results in terms of ‘situation models’: integrated 
representations of token individuals and pieces of information about them. If the pieces of 
information are consistent with a single situation, they are integrated into a unified model. 
The fan effect occurs when information is distributed across multiple models, each of which 
must be separately accessed for retrieval.  
Situation models differ from, e.g., Recanati’s files, to the extent that what determines 
integration of pieces of information is their content, not the ER channel they issue from. Still, 
the resemblance of ‘situation models’ to mental files in semantic memory, as opposed to an 
unconstrained notion of ‘chunk’, should be clear: Like files, what ties ‘situation models’ 
together is plausibly copredication. The differential fan effect thus supports a picture 
according to which it is harder to access information distributed across multiple files rather 
than co-filed. Furthermore, since the fan effect occurs for a variety of non-object individuals 
(such as people, situations, and locations), it hints towards the psychological reality of file-
like structures for such individuals. 
Nevertheless, since the differential fan effect has no strict analog in mid-level perception, it is 
unclear how much such files resemble object-files. In ongoing experiments, we investigate 
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whether semantic memory exhibits effects more closely analogous to those Luck & Vogel and 
colleagues found in VWM for objects, and Woods found for events. In these experiments, 
subjects perform a change detection task akin to the Luck & Vogel paradigm, except that the 
information to be retained is semantic rather than visual: Participants have to memorize up to 
three pieces of information about a varying number of people, and then detect changes – 
perceptually detectable changes in the displays are irrelevant. We have so far not found any 
characteristic ‘filing effect’. Performance is determined solely by total number of features to 
be remembered: when the number of features increases, performance decreases linearly.  
Signature triggering and maintenance conditions 
Another signature of object-files are their signature triggering and maintenance conditions, 
based on such factors as spatiotemporal priority, and criteria of cohesion, continuity and 
contact. 
 
At first glance, these signatures might appear not to apply to higher-level concepts of 
individuals. Consider a situation in which you identify some creature as Patrick as the result 
of effortful abductive inference, e.g., “I am in Ballarat. That is an old and large wombat. 
Everyone is calling it ‘wombassador’. So it must be Patrick”. In terms of the file metaphor: 
what triggers a certain putative file, and makes you apply it to an individual, is that it seems to 
you upon reflection to match the file’s entries, not that preconceptual input-analyzers spit the 
file out automatically on the basis of spatiotemporal factors. Clearly, access to such a 
(hypothetical) file is descriptive: it depends on a “theory-based sustaining mechanism” 
(Margolis, 1998, p. 354), not an ER-based one. As previously noted, Carey and Xu 
differentiate concepts of individuals which are thus descriptively triggered and applied from 
files.  
 
In response, defenders of MFT would no doubt remark, firstly, that the fact that a file is 
descriptively addressed does not necessarily make the file non-singular in other senses: its 
reference, individuation, and maybe even entries, could still be determined nondescriptively. 
Secondly, there could still be some sense in which the file is applied on the basis of 
predominantly spatiotemporal factors. Scholl (2007) argues that the sorts of intuitions relevant 
to metaphysical debates about object persistence reflect, more or less directly, the signature 
triggering and maintenance conditions of object-files: what we judge to be one and the same 
object at the fully conceptual level are entities we believe to be of the sort that object-files 
could track, i.e., that move on spatiotemporally continous paths, etc.  
The problem is that, even if there is an obvious resemblance between our folk criteria of 
object-persistence and the maintenance conditions of object-files, it is equally clear that our 
mature criteria of individual-persistence depart significantly from these. Rips and colleagues 
(Blok, Newman, & Rips, 2005; Rips, 2011) have not found spatiotemporal factors to be 
decisive in  persistence judgments at the fully conceptual level. Well-known intuitions about 
non-spatio-temporally continuous persons, artifacts, or abstracta in the philosophical 
literature also suggest this (Gallois, 2008). For example, many of our intuitions about personal 
identity seem to have more to do with hidden psychological essences, than spatiotemporal 
factors. An interesting case is noted by Gelman & Bloom (2008): to be elected the 14th Dalai 
Lama, a boy must choose between qualitatively identical possessions of his previous 
incarnation, which are thought to be imbued with the essence of the 13th Dalai Lama. Such 
singular essence-based tracking appears to operate according to different psychological 
principles than the spatiotemporally-based tracking of the object-file system. 
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Signature domain-specificity 
As the previous subsection suggests, one of the apparently striking differences between 
object-files and higher-level singular concepts has to do with domain-specificity: moving 
beyond concrete Spelke objects, adults acquire a formal conception of individuals, 
corresponding to (roughly) whatever singular terms pick out (Bloom, 2002; Casati, 2004). 
 
It remains tempting to see some connection between the capacity to master singular terms, and 
the capacity to perceptually track objects. Gentner (1982) influentially proposed that children 
are biased to interpret novel words as names of whole-objects. If someone points towards 
Patrick, and says ‘Patrick’, a word the child has never heard, she tends to interpret it as 
referring to Patrick, and not his tail, one of his properties, some event, etc. Indeed, names of 
objects are frequent among children’s first words (Hall, 2009). Although we eventually give 
names to all sorts of entities, it might seem that, at some basic level, the proper-nameable 
entities match the dedicated domain of object-files. There could thus remain a trace of object-
files’ signature domain-specificity at the heart of our linguistic capacity. 
Among proponents of MFT, Jeshion (2009, 2010) puts weight on the connection between the 
domains of files and proper names.  However, rather than conceive of proper nameable 
entities as objects, based on object-file research, she infers a (novel) signature property of 
files from what she takes to be a signature property of names: Jeshion (2010, p. 136) 
hypothesizes that files obey a ‘significance condition’, according to which “a mental file is 
initiated on an individual only if that individual is significant to the agent with respect to her 
plans, projects, affective states, motivations.” Jeshion sees this purported signature property of 
files as evidenced by our naming practices: We only give proper names to significant 
individuals.  
Thus we have a potential argument for vertical extension of files in which domain-specificity 
figures: Files preferentially target the domain of significant individuals, like names. However, 
this argument is problematic.  
The fact that people are proper-nameable par excellence (Hall, 2009) might seem to support 
Jeshion’s view: people are significant. But projecting mental files’ significance to object-files 
is empirically unjustified. Despite Jeshion's appeal to object-files as close ontogenetic 
precursors of mental files, there is no empirical evidence that they obey the ‘significance 
condition’. On the contrary: Krøjgaard (2000) investigates whether significance matters for 
object-files using a modified version of the Carey & Xu paradigm: One object is the child's 
favorite toy, hence highly significant, whereas the other is unfamiliar. Results suggest “it 
makes no difference for the infants' reactions whether the objects that disappear behind a 
screen are novel or significant” (Krøjgaard, 2000, p. 181). This is unsurprising, if the object-
file system is an encapsulated system which does not care about anything much apart from 
spatiotemporal factors. But this result is unexpected on Jeshion’s picture, where files resemble 
names by obeying the significance condition.27  
In sum, direct evidence that representations in higher-level cognition share signatures of 
object-files is currently mixed. In the absence of clear-cut evidence for vertical extension, in 
the following section we consider more indirect evidence. 
                                                 
27
 Jeshion might respond that while the internal computations of the object-file system don’t obey the 
significance condition, the mere fact that an object-file is tokened for an individual makes it significant to the 
subject. However, this seems hard to square with the possibility of unconscious object-files. 
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7.2. Indirect evidence for vertical extension? 
Developmental and evolutionary considerations have been adduced in favor of files’ extension 
beyond core cognition. For example, Recanati (2012, 2013) justifies vertical extension by 
appealing to files’ acquisition of “derived functions”: Files whose primary function is to refer 
to perceived individuals acquire the far broader functions associated with discourse reference. 
Similarly, Jeshion (2010, p. 135) proposes that FINSTs/object-files are “coupled” with 
linguistic demonstratives, and “mental demonstratives, construed as a type, come to function 
as mental stand-ins for FINSTs. They develop so as to function constitutively as abstract 
singular referring devices by means of which we think singularly about individuals.”28 After 
mentioning one source of data that could help make these proposals more than attractive ‘just-
so’ stories, we conclude by noting some challenges. 
 
The evolutionary story MFT tells to justify files’ vertical extension connects attentive tracking 
to pointing, and then pointing to linguistic deixis and, ultimately, discourse reference.  
Leaving aside temporarily the first step of this process (from visual attention to gestural 
pointing), a major challenge this view faces is to show that there is more than a metaphorical 
sense in which the formal indexing involved in, e.g., anaphora resembles physical indexing, 
i.e., directing one’s hearer’s attention by pointing one’s finger (or other body part) at a 
referent present in the discourse context. How does one get from the unconventionalized 
gestures which accompany speech to representations which constitute part of the linguistic 
capacity?  
Recent work on sign-language may provide the missing link: Sign languages employ pointing 
gestures not only for deixis but also for anaphora. To refer to (possibly absent) individuals 
(persons, times, places or situations), signers first establish a locus for that individual in 
signing space using a nominal sign or a point. Subsequent reference to that same individual 
occurs by (literally) pointing back to that locus. Loci are “overt realization of indices” 
(Schlenker, 2011, p. 351). Although pronouns and anaphora are realized differently in signed 
and spoken languages, the same capacity is at play, i.e., pointing gestures in sign language are 
genuinely linguistic and even grammatical. Pronouns in SL obey similar binding constraints 
as their counterparts in other modalities (Meier & Lillo-Martin, 2013). 
As Meier & Lillo-Martin (2013, p. 154) explain, “the study of pointing in signed languages 
gives us a window into how gestural elements become linguistic over time.” Some sign-
languages are young enough that we can observe their maturation from rudimentary 
homesigns to fully conventionalized languages. An example is Nicaraguan Sign Language 
(NSL), which appeared in the 1970s. Coppola & Senghas (2010) study the integration of 
indexical pointing into NSL. How the form is used by successive cohorts of signers “create[s] 
a record, like rings on a tree” (p. 548) of deixis’ evolution. Results support the story in which 
co-speech pointing progressively looses its concrete spatial content and exophoric function, 
and gains abstract anaphoric and grammatical functions – a pattern also observed in 
diachronic crosslinguistic studies (Diessel, 1999). 
Such research, whose results converge with neurolinguistic data suggesting that the 
processing of discourse reference relies on brain regions for spatial attention (Almor, Smith, 
Bonilha, Fridriksson, & Rorden, 2007), is a promising source of support for files’ vertical 
extension. Nevertheless, challenges remain. 
                                                 
28
 Hurford (2003) proposes a similar three-stage model of the evolution of reference, starting with FINSTs and 
culminating in communicative reference. 
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Firstly, while there is evidence for the evolutionary step from communicative pointing to 
discourse reference, this is not the most crucial chapter in the story MFT tells. Although 
philosophers describe basic singular thoughts as ‘demonstrative’, there is a gap between the 
capacities required for perceptual tracking, and for understanding not only simple referential 
expressions like demonstratives, but even pre-linguistic forms of pointing found in all 
humans. Declarative pointing requires the metarepresentational capacity to grasp others’ 
communicative intentions and make inferences based on a common ground, capacities which 
may be uniquely human (Tomasello, 2008). It is not enough to show that deictic gestures that 
accompany speech grow into linguistic elements; how we get from object-files to human 
pointing requires explanation.  
Secondly, the fact that one representational category evolved from another only weakly 
suggests they are of the same psychological natural kind. This is the sense in which 
evolutionary or developmental evidence remains indirect: Kindhood is not defined purely 
historically, but requires shared psychological properties. In fact, putting too much weight on 
evolutionary considerations actually threatens MFT. Deixis is a basic linguistic form, which 
evolves into many other forms – a process known as “polygrammaticalization” (Diessel, 
1999) As a result, developmental paths can be traced not only from deixis to singular 
discourse reference, but also to other forms which prima facie have nothing to do with the 
expression of singular thought. To give just two examples, in many languages sentence 
connectives and the copula have evolved from demonstratives (Diessel, 1999). Surely one 
would not wish to say that therefore, thoughts canonically expressed using such terms in the 
relevant languages involve the file-based indexing system, or are in any sense singular.  
We conclude that the most ambitious version of MFT, according to which mental files are a 
wide-ranging psychological natural kind underlying all and only singular thinking, is 
unsupported by the available data. Defenders of MFT may have overestimated the similarities 
between different notions of ‘file’ used in philosophy and cognitive science. Nevertheless, 
critical examination of MFT opens up exciting avenues for further empirical research, 
especially concerning the relationship between our perceptual capacity to individuate and 
track basic individuals, and our higher-level capacities for singular thought. Mental files thus 
constitute a particularly promising field of interdisciplinary investigation, at the intersection 
of psychology, linguistics, and philosophy.  
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